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Introduction1 
We recently passed the fortieth anniversary of Rabbi 
Soloveitchik’s magisterial essay on interreligious dialogue, 
Confrontation.2 Rabbi Soloveitchik (1903-1993) was the 
leading modern Orthodox religious authority in America 
during his lifetime and his religious opinions and rulings are 
still considered authoritative by American orthodoxy. That he 
is called the Rav (the Rabbi) by many reflects this high 
standing. His 1964 essay on interreligious dialogue has 
defined the orthodox community’s approach to dialogue with 
other religions, in particular Roman Catholicism. Indeed, 
many in the orthodox community have viewed the essay as 
a legal decision or psak halacha3 and some have referred to 
it as the “Soloveitchik Line.”4 Three years ago Rabbi Eugene 
Korn provided a probing reassessment of that essay in a 
symposium on the question of interfaith dialogue sponsored 
                                                          
1 I want to thank Claire Morisset for research assistance, and Rabbi Jack 
Bemporad and A.G. Harmon for their careful reading of an earlier 
version of the text. 
2  Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, “Confrontation,” Tradition 6/2 (1964): 5ff., 
available at http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/ 
cjrelations/resources/articles/soloveitchik/. 
3  As are clearly the piskei halacha of Rav Moshe Feinstein.  See David 
Ellenson, “A Jewish Legal Authority Addresses Jewish-Christian 
Dialogue,” American Jewish Archives 52/1-2 (2000):112ff.  One should 
note on this point David Hartman’s description of the Rav’s essay “as a 
rare theological responsum carrying the weight of a halakhic decision.  
None of R. Soloveitchik’s other theological writings were understood to 
have the authority of Halakhah” [David Hartman, Love and Terror in the 
God Encounter: The Theological Legacy of Rabbi Joseph B. 
Soloveitchik (Woodstock, VT: Jewish Lights, 2004), 132]. 
4  Norman Solomon, “The ‘Soloveitchik Line’ on Dialogue” in Dan Cohn-
Sherbok ed., Problems in Contemporary Jewish Theology (Lewiston, 
NY: E. Mellen Press, 1991), 225.  
by Boston College.5 That reassessment in turn brought forth 
further comments.6  Below are some of my own reactions to 
this ongoing debate. 
Soloveitchik’s essay presents a complex argument 
based on a moral anthropology embedded in an 
interpretation of the biblical account of the creation of man.7  
The article develops three paradigms of human nature.  The 
first paradigm is that of man as a natural creature.8  In that 
state, “[h]e fails to realize his great capacity for winning 
freedom from an unalterable natural order and offering this 
very freedom as the great sacrifice to God, who wills man to 
be free in order that he may commit himself unreservedly 
and forfeit his freedom.”9  
The second paradigm presents man in the 
confrontational or normative state.10  He separates himself 
from nature and “discovers an awesome and mysterious 
domain of things and events which is independent of and 
disobedient to him.… In the wake of this discovery, he 
discovers himself.”  As a result of that self-discovery and its 
opposition with “a non-I outside,” the divine norm is born:  
“‘And the Lord God commanded the man.’”11 
                                                          
5  Eugene Korn, “The Man of Faith and Religious Dialogue:  Revisiting 
‘Confrontation’ After Forty Years.” http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-
elements/texts/center/conferences/soloveitchik/Korn_23Nov03.htm. 
Rabbi Korn has since published an updated version, “The Man of Faith 
and Religious Dialogue: Revisiting ‘Confrontation’,” Modern Judaism 
25/2 (2005):290-315. 
6   http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/center/conferences/ 
soloveitchik/#2  
7  “Confrontation,” 5-17. 
8  Ibid., 5-9. 
9  Ibid., 7. 
10 Ibid., 9-13. 
11 Ibid., 9. 
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Finally, the third paradigm is that of reciprocal 
confrontation, based on readings of the relationship between 
Adam and Eve and Jacob and Esau,12 
At this level, man finds himself confronted 
again. Only this time it is not the confrontation of 
a subject who gazes, with a sense of superiority, 
at the object beneath him, but of two equal 
subjects, both lonely in their otherness and 
uniqueness, both opposed and rejected by an 
objective order, both craving for companionship.  
This confrontation is reciprocal, not unilateral.  
This time the two confronters stand alongside 
each other, each admitting the existence of the 
other. An aloof existence is transformed into a 
together-existence.”13 
From this theological understanding of the development 
of human nature Soloveitchik concludes that the faith 
experience is private and incommunicable.  Building on that 
argument he determines that proposals for interreligious 
dialogue are analytically flawed and should be proscribed. 
Eugene Korn, in turn, suggests that sociological and 
philosophical changes in Western society since the writing of 
“Confrontation” warrant a reassessment of the proscription 
against interreligious dialogue, especially in light of the 
Catholic Church’s abandonment of its doctrine of 
supersession. 
This paper will examine first the structural logic of 
Soloveitchik’s argument.  It will then explore the intellectual 
and sociological background and assumptions which 
undergird his approach.  Finally, I briefly discuss what I see 
as the virtues of interreligious dialogue. 
 
                                                          
12  Ibid., 14. 
13  Ibid.  
1. Soloveitchik’s Argument 
 
A.  The Suggestion that Interreligious Dialogue is Flawed 
because Belief is Incommensurable. 
 
According to one view, in “Confrontation” Soloveitchik is 
making an epistemological argument that faith claims are 
ultimately incommensurable and must be taken for what they 
are, faith claims.14  Thus he states:  “The great encounter 
between God and man is a wholly personal private affair 
incomprehensible to the outsider”15 and “The divine 
message is incommunicable since it defies all standardized 
media of information and all objective categories.”16  
Perhaps this approach reflects Soloveitchik’s analogy to the 
encounter between Adam and Eve where Soloveitchik 
explains that “the closer two individuals get to know each 
other, the more aware they become of the metaphysical 
distance separating them.”17 He further tells us that this is 
true “even to a brother of the same faith community.”18 
We must be clear that when Soloveitchik refers to 
incommensurability he is actually talking about a limited 
class of religious language.  He appears to be arguing that 
the language of religious claims is a language whose words 
“refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to 
his immediate private sensations.”19  The only way this could 
                                                          
14  Ibid., 18-19. 
15  Ibid., 24. 
16  Ibid., 15. 
17  Ibid. 
18  Ibid. 
19 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York: 
Macmillan, 1953), Sec. 243 at 89e, says it is akin to a private “diary 
about the recurrence of a certain sensation.” See also, Sec. 258 at 92e 
and the reference to “private sensations.” 
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make sense is if Soloveitchik were referring to the religious 
sensory experience itself, and not to Jewish theology or 
even the “life form” of Judaism, to use a Wittgensteinian 
term. 
The issue of the possibility of a “private language” is 
extremely controversial and has engendered considerable 
philosophical literature.20 Ludwig Wittgenstein argued 
against the possibility of a private language in his 1953 book 
Philosophical Investigations.21 As Stewart Candlish has 
written, “[t]he essence of the argument is simple. It is that a 
language in principle unintelligible to anyone but its user 
would necessarily be unintelligible to the user also, because 
no meanings could be established for its signs. … The 
conclusion is that it is impossible for a private linguist to 
establish and maintain a rule for the use of an expression, so 
that meaning is unobtainable in a private language.”22  At 
best, Wittgenstein seems to suggest that the private 
language concept might be available for the recordation of 
speech that refers to an individual’s own sensations.23 
The opportunity of applying any kind of ‘private language’ 
to religious claims, however, has been critiqued by Kai 
Nielsen who argues that even if religious language reflects a 
distinct “form of life”24 (which suggests that no one but a 
                                                          
20 See, e.g., John V. Canfield, ed., The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, Vol. 9: 
The Private Language Argument (New York: Garland, 1986), especially 
the essays by Ayer (p. 1), Kenny (pp. 130 and 208), and Anscombe (p. 
316). 
21  See note 19. 
22 Stewart Candlish, “Private Language Argument,” in Edward Craig ed., 
The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998), 
vol. 7: 693-698. 
23 Wittgenstein, Sec. 243 at 88e-89e. 
24  Kai Nielsen, “Wittgensteinian Fideism,” Philosophy 42 (1967): 193: “The 
different modes of discourse which are distinctive forms of life have a 
logic of their own.”  
believer can criticize a particular religion), this does not 
preclude our asking about the coherence of the concepts 
involved and about the reality of what its members have 
conceptualized.  As Nielsen points out, “The need to start 
from ‘inside’ need not preclude the recognition of clefts, 
inconsistencies, and elements of incoherence in the very 
practice (form of life).”25 
Some, like David Berger, have tried to salvage 
Soloveitchik’s notion of incommensurability by suggesting 
that while the “intellectual apprehension” of faith, in contrast 
to the “personal experience” of faith, can be communicated, 
such communication “is pitifully inadequate.”26  In contrast, 
others like Rabbi Irving Greenberg argue that 
[I]n matters doctrinal and theological, all 
religions spoke their own private language.  It 
would be a violation of the spiritual-theological 
intimacy between the religious community 
and God to share the content of the internal 
conversation with members of another faith.  
Translating the categories of faith into 
terminology comprehensible to believers of 
another tradition would be a betrayal.27 
Thus, Jews can ‘talk’ the language of Jewish theology to 
Jews, but not to Christians. 
                                                          
25  Nielsen, 205-206. 
26 Rabbi David Berger, “Revisiting ‘Confrontation’ After Forty Years:  A 
Response to Rabbi Eugene Korn,” available at:  http://www.bc.edu/ 
research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/center/conferences/soloveitchik/ 
Berger_23Nov03.htm. 
27 Irving Greenberg, For the Sake of Heaven and Earth:  The New 
Encounter between Judaism and Christianity (Philadelphia: Jewish 
Publication Society, 2004), 13. I fail to understand the concept of 
betrayal here. Indeed, it would seem that much of Greenberg’s 
theological work performs this “translation” function.  
Studies in Christian-Jewish Relations                    Volume 1, (2005-2006): 151-169 
Breger, “A Reassesssment of Rav Soloveitchik’s Essay on Interfaith Dialogue”    155 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol1/iss1/art18  
I fail to understand, however, why a faith experience 
cannot be dissected and discussed.  Even if I experience 
God in a chariot trailing clouds of glory, why am I incapable 
of describing that experience, however inartfully?  
Nonetheless, Berger’s point, even if true, is essentially 
irrelevant to our discussion of the possibility of dialogue.  
What we normally understand as theological dialogue is not 
the comparison of mutual personal faith experiences but 
rather the discussion of principles of faith. The delegitimation 
of substantive theological dialogue, as will be noted later, 
must be based on different grounds. 
If perceptions of faith cannot be communicated between 
different communities of faith, are we to argue that a 
member of one faith community cannot lecture or write about 
his faith to a member of another faith community?  
Remember, Soloveitchik himself gave his famous lecture 
“The Lonely Man of Faith”28 to a Catholic audience.  
Obviously he was concerned with communicating with his 
audience. 
To carry the point further, if issues of faith are 
incommensurable, what do we say about the work of 
scholars like Harry Wolfson who wrote on the Church 
Fathers,29 Travers Herford who wrote on the Pharisees as 
well as the Talmud,30 or George Foot Moore who studied 
Judaism in the age of the mishnah?31 
                                                          
28 Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, The Lonely Man of Faith (New Jersey: 
Jason Aronson Inc., 1965) 
29  Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964). 
30 R. Travers Herford, The Pharisees (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962) and 
Talmud and Apocrypha and a Comparative Study of the Jewish Ethical 
Teaching in the Rabbinical and Non-Rabbinical Sources in the Early 
Centuries (London: Soncino Press, 1933).  
31 George Foot Moore, Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era, 
the Age of the Tannaim (New York: Schocken Books, 1971). 
As to Greenberg’s suggestion of betrayal, restated by 
Shalom Carmy as the view that no “refined person would 
‘dialogue’ explicitly with friends and acquaintances about his 
most intimate family relations,”32 I see this as an argument 
about propriety, not impossibility. I would suggest that the 
propriety would depend on the facts and circumstances of 
the individual case. 
 
B. The Relationship Between the “Community of the 
Many” and the “Community of the Few.” 
 
In large measure, I suspect Soloveitchik’s concern was 
that any dialogue between the majority religion (Christianity) 
and the minority religion (Judaism) would not be a dialogue 
between equal subjects, but between a majority lording it 
over a minority. He appears to believe that in any dialogue 
with Christians, Jews as a minority religion will not receive 
what they expect from others, “recognition not as objects, 
but precisely as subjects of faith.”33 He seems to suggest 
that such encounters can only come out badly for Jews. 
Thus, we can best comprehend Soloveitchik’s 
understanding of interfaith dialogue as a claim regarding 
disputations – that is to say a dispute between two sides with 
a winner and a loser.  The long and lachrymose history of 
such dialogue between Jews and Christians34 would 
                                                          
32 Shalom Carmy, “’Orthodoxy is Reticence’ – Taking Theology Seriously,” 
http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/center/conferences/ 
soloveitchik/sol_carmy.htm. 
33 Leon Klenicki, “The Jewish Religious Traditions” in George F. McLean & 
John P. Hogan eds., Ecumenism and Nostra Aetate in the 21st Century 
35, 37 (Washington, D.C.: John Paul II Cultural Center, Council for 
Research in Values and Philosophy, 2005): 37. 
34 See for example Hyam Maccoby, Judaism On Trial: Jewish Christian 
Disputations in the Middle Ages (Rutherford, NJ.: Fairleigh Dickinson 
University Press, 1982) which describes disputations in Paris in 1240, 
Barcelona in 1263, and Tortosa in 1413-14, on pp. 19, 39 and 82 
respectively. The Barcelona disputation included Nachmanides.  See 
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certainly support this view.  As Irving Greenberg suggests, in 
Soloveitchik’s understanding, the result would be “a 
distortion in which the views of the minority – that is, Jews – 
would be placed on a Procrustean bed and would be 
stretched and cut to the measure of the majority faith.”35 
I do not understand contemporary efforts at interreligious 
dialogue in that sense. Interreligious dialogue is not a debate 
to determine whose view of God is correct or “better.”  
Rather, it is an effort at understanding – understanding   the 
“other” religion and its theological basis. Such inter-
convictional dialogue, I would argue, can lead to “fruitful 
engagement in the meeting of diverse religious 
communities.”36  But it is clear that “a prime element in fruitful 
encounter must be the location of actual belief differences.”37 
For Jews this is especially important because it means 
providing an accurate description of the concepts of Judaism 
and where they differ from Christianity. This, I might add, will 
often require assisting Christians to understand that many of 
their historically enshrined stereotypes of Jewish law and 
theology do not reflect what Jews actually believe. Such 
dialogue is far from an attempt to reconcile differences. 
The essential point of Korn’s position regarding interfaith 
dialogue is the distinction between dialogue and disputation.  
He likes the former and will have nothing to do with the 
latter. That distinction, it seems to me, is really one of motive 
and nothing more. Certainly one can understand why Korn 
would argue that Jews should not enter into discussions 
about religion with persons seeking to convert them. At a 
minimum (in Soloveitchik’s terms) such conduct shows a 
complete lack of “mutual respect.” Nonetheless it is unclear 
                                                                                                                       
Robert Chazan, Barcelona and Beyond: The Disputation of 1263 and Its 
Aftermath (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). 
35  Greenberg, 13. 
36 James Van McClendon and James M. Smith, Understanding Religious 
Convictions (Notre Dame, IN: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 175.  
37 Ibid.  
to me why the motive for making a statement has anything to 
do with the truth of that statement. If this point is correct then 
Korn’s (and Soloveitchik’s?) opposition to dialogue is a 
matter of taste, not a matter of analytic truth. 
Now I have to be fair. I don’t know if Christians want to 
enter the dialogue simply in an attempt to understand the 
other religion and its theological base. Perhaps they want to 
convince me or to convince themselves of the superiority of 
their faith system. So be it. Or to put it another way, why do I 
care? If I can learn something about the nature of the world 
or the nature of the human spiritual longing while they are 
trying to score points, it’s their problem. 
Now I would not have said that during the Middle Ages 
when Judaism was in an empirically inferior position to 
Christianity. Perhaps then I would have worried that my 
coreligionists (or even I, myself) would have lost heart in the 
interreligious dialogue and passed over to the other “team.”  
But that was then and this is now. 
 
C. An Assessment of the Inequality of the Relationship 
between Various Religions 
 
 My reading of “Confrontation” suggests that in 
Soloveitchik’s view, the deep theological structure of 
Christianity is antagonistic to Judaism and Christianity would 
not be Christianity if it did not treat Jews as unequal.  
Although he does not use these terms, one can argue that 
Soloveitchik’s approach to the status of the Catholic-Jewish 
relationship is essentialist and determinist. It is as if 
Soloveitchik understood the relationship between Judaism 
and Christianity in ontological terms, as a relationship in 
which the inequality is immutable, as though the negativity 
were rooted in necessary Christian doctrine.  By this I mean 
that they reflect in some sense a moral anthropology – one 
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fixed and incapable of essential or transformative change.38  
And that being the case, Soloveitchik’s stricture against 
interfaith dialogue is absolute and not contingent on either 
history or sociology. 
One can well understand why Soloveitchik, steeped as 
he was in Jewish history and religious thought, would hold 
this view. Further, as Korn notes, Soloveitchik wrote in 1964, 
one year before Vatican II and the stream of theological re-
evaluations undertaken by the Catholic Church. 
Prior to this development, the Church was wedded to the 
teaching of contempt,39 buttressed by a doctrine of 
supersession which stated that whatever value Judaism had 
ended with the coming of Christianity. That position is no 
more. Consider but one text, the 2002 Pontifical Biblical 
Commission document, The Jewish People and their Sacred 
Scriptures in the Christian Bible.40 It is official Church 
teaching with a preface by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, at the 
time head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 
and now Pope Benedict XVI. That document states, “Without 
the Old Testament the New Testament would be an 
                                                          
38  See Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, “Tav Lemeitav Tan Du Mi-Lemeitav Armalu:  
An Analysis of the Presumption,” Edah 4/1 (2004), available at 
http://www.edah.org/backend/JournalArticle/4_1_kaddari.pdf. It is inter-
esting that Halperin-Kaddari associates such a view with the Rav in her 
analysis of the talmudic presumption of Tav Lemeitav Tan Du Mi-
Lemeitav Armalu that a woman would rather be married to a bad 
husband than remain single, Baba Qamma 110b-111a.  She reviews the 
various understandings of that concept.  She notes that the Rav took a 
relatively “strict” view of Tav Lemeitav, appearing to base his analysis 
on an ontological understanding of the “essence” of the gender 
distinction which has, in his own words, “nothing to do with the social 
and political status of women in antiquity.” The presumption, he 
suggests, is not based on psychology, but “is an existential fact.” It may 
be that Soloveitchik approaches the relationship of the “community of 
the many” and the “community of the few” in a similarly determinist way. 
39 Jules Isaac, The Teaching of Contempt: Christian Roots of Anti-
Semitism (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964). 
40 Available at: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/ 
pcb_documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20020212_popolo-ebraico_en.html. 
incomprehensible book, a plant deprived of its roots and 
destined to dry up and wither.”41 And consider this 
statement: “Jewish messianic expectation is not in vain.  It 
can become for us Christians a powerful stimulant to keep 
alive the eschatological dimension of our faith.  Like them, 
we too live in expectation.”42  Following Romans 11:1,43 the 
document elaborates and reaffirms that the Jewish people 
have an eternal, unbreakable covenant with God, as indeed 
do numerous Church documents published after Vatican II. 
Faced with this evidence of recent history, one can take 
either of two approaches. 
One can remain skeptical of Catholic intentions and 
argue that one should not really believe that this doctrinal 
transformation is sincere or will last. For such persons their 
required threshold of proof means that as a practical matter 
they will never accept the Church’s bona fides in this area.  
There are adumbrations of this approach in the comments to 
Korn’s paper by Erica Brown44 and Aryeh Klapper.45 I believe 
that (writing before Vatican II) Soloveitchik’s opposition to 
                                                          
41 Ibid, Preface. 
42 Ibid., §21. 
43 “What I am saying is this: is it possible that God abandoned his people?  
Out of the question!  I too am an Israelite, descended from Abraham, of 
the tribe of Benjamin.”  (New Jerusalem Bible) 
44 “Political correctness cannot be bought at the price of historical dignity. 
Rethinking the proselytization of Jews is still not enough to bring us to 
authentic dialogue about our belief systems.”  Erica Brown, “The Un-
Response,” http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/center/ 
conferences/soloveitchik/sol_brown.htm. 
45 “What one pope has done, another can put asunder – I will never forget 
Hirsch Goodman, in the August 2001 issue of Jerusalem Report, 
explaining that the peace of Oslo had become entrenched in Palestinian 
hearts to the extent that it was irreversible.  The Vatican’s grudging and 
belated diplomatic acceptance of the Israeli state is to my mind far from 
an acknowledgment of the Jewish right to our homeland.” Aryeh 
Klapper, “Revisiting ‘Confrontation’ After Forty Years – A Response to 
Rabbi Eugene Korn,” http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/ 
texts/center/conferences/soloveitchik/Klapper_23Nov03.htm. 
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interfaith dialogue drew on a suspicion “that a strong 
conversionist impulse lurked behind Christian dialogue 
efforts” and a fear “that a tidal wave of interfaith interest 
might sweep many Jews into the bosom of the church.”46 
The second approach, shared, I believe by both Eugene 
Korn47 and David Berger48 (but not made explicitly) is that 
                                                          
46  Greenberg, 13. 
47  Eugene Korn (see note 5) points out: 
 The critical distinction between the respectful hearing of the religious 
voices of others and doctrinal disputation untangles the paradox of R. 
Soloveitchik's private conversation with Christian religious thinkers, whose 
insights he integrated into his religious Weltanschauung, and his rejection 
of formal interfaith dialogue on theological subjects. The former posed no 
threat to the validity of his faith, while he assumed that the latter was 
targeted at undermining Jewish faith commitment. To employ the favorite 
technique of R. Soloveitchik's Brisker tradition, there are two concepts of 
theological discourse: one is authentic dialogue, which is free religious 
expression that is governed by the legitimacy of difference and mutual 
respect; the other is polemical disputation, which is futile in its illogic and 
objectionable in its triumphalism. 
48  David Berger (see note 26) argues: 
 [A]s much as theological propositions can be conveyed, as much as even 
religious emotions can be partially expressed, that which ultimately 
commits a person to God or a faith community to its particular relationship 
with God remains essentially private, leaving not only a lonely man of faith 
but a lonely people of faith – a nation that dwells alone.  
      Since Rabbi Soloveitchik believed that untrammeled interfaith dialogue 
presumes to enter into that realm, he declares it out of bounds. Even 
though dialogue among believers concentrating on social issues has a 
religious dimension, it does not presume to enter that innermost realm, 
and its value therefore outweighs its dangers. If I am correct, then even 
theological discussion that knows its place would not be subject to the 
most radical critique in “Confrontation,” and in this general sense I am in 
agreement with Dr. Korn. 
 Berger continues: 
 But it is critically important to recognize that the incommunicability of the 
ultimate religious commitment is not the totality of Rabbi Soloveitchik’s 
argument. The very fact that he goes beyond that point lends credence to 
the view that he did not mean it as an all-encompassing delegitimation of 
any theological discussion. If he did, there would have been little reason 
to go further. But he does go further, and here his argument moves from 
the extreme rhetoric of philosophical absolutism to the penetrating, 
Soloveitchik’s injunction against dialogue should be 
understood as a prudential point about the wisdom of 
dialogue rather than a normative argument asserting the 
impossibility of dialogue. 
On this view one would recognize that the intellectual 
and sociological context has changed in fundamental ways 
in the forty years since “Confrontation” was written, and that 
these changes cannot help but have an effect on the force of 
Soloveitchik’s conclusions. While I am certainly sympathetic 
to this approach as a way of salvaging Soloveitchik’s views 
in the light of historical change, nowhere does Soloveitchik 
say some dialogue is acceptable by certain people under 
certain circumstances. While he does set down four 
conditions for interfaith dialogue,49 a fair reading of the essay 
suggests that in Soloveitchik’s view these conditions cannot 
ever be met. 
                                                                                                                       
pragmatic, prescient insights that make “Confrontation” an essay of 
ongoing relevance. 
49  I quote from “Confrontation”: 
 First, we must state, in unequivocal terms, the following.  We are a totally 
independent faith community.  We do not revolve as a satellite in any 
orbit.  Nor are we related to any other faith community as “brethren” even 
though “separated.” . . . . [p. 21]. 
 Second, the logos, the word, in which the multifarious religious 
experience is expressed does not lend itself to standardization or 
universalization.… [I]t is important that the religious or theological logos 
should not be employed as the medium of communication between two 
faith communities whose modes of expression are as unique as their 
apocalyptic experiences . . . . [pp. 23-24]. 
 Third, we members of the community of the few should always act with 
tact and understanding and refrain from suggesting to the community of 
the many, which is both proud and prudent, changes in ritual or 
emendations of its texts…. Interference with and non-involvement in 
something which is totally alien to us is a conditio sine qua non for the 
furtherance of good will and mutual respect [pp. 24-25]. 
 Fourth, we certainly have not been authorized by our history, sanctified by 
the martyrdom of millions, to even hint to another faith community that we 
are mentally ready to revise historical attitudes, to trade favors pertaining 
to fundamental matters of faith, and to reconcile “some” differences [p 25]. 
 See also Korn’s discussion [see note 5] of these conditions.  
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D. The Danger of Syncretism 
 
One of the fears Soloveitchik expressed was the danger 
of syncretism, that is, the attempted reconciliation or union of 
different or opposing religious principles, or practices, by 
incorporating elements of one religion into another. This 
concern has some basis in reality. Many of the less 
sophisticated proponents of interreligious dialogue point to 
the overlapping roots of Judaism and Christianity and move 
rapidly to the idea that common origins means a common 
belief. Many politicians refer blithely to the Judeo-Christian 
tradition to promote religious tolerance and the full 
integration of Jews into American society. This ecumenism 
can easily lead to a subjectivism by which all religions (or at 
least all Abrahamic religions) are seen as essentially equal – 
each being as good as the next. On this view, “all religions 
are diverse symbolic objectifications of the same basic 
spiritual experience and intimation of Ultimate Being.”50 
Alternatively the search for a common core can result in 
a dilution of one’s own distinct religious doctrine. I once 
learned political theory with the magisterial John Plamenetz, 
who notwithstanding his erudition managed somehow to 
make thinkers as disparate as Hegel, Rousseau and Kant 
come out as slightly eccentric English liberals. Something 
similar could result from untrammeled interreligious dialogue.  
And indeed if you read a book like Faith Transformed:  
Christian Encounters with Jews and Judaism51 it is obvious 
                                                          
50 Tamar Ross, “Reflections on the Possibilities of Interfaith 
Communication in Our Day,” Edah 1/1 (2000):5 at http://www.edah.org/ 
backend/JournalArticle/ross.pdf. She goes on to say,  “[M]y exposure to 
any rival religion can teach me something about our common core, thus 
increasing the potential for correction and refinement of my own 
particular truth. In that event, interfaith encounters become mutually 
enriching and the existence of diverse religious expressions mandates 
cooperation and mutual respect” (p. 5).  
51 John C. Merkle, ed., Faith Transformed: Christian Encounters with Jews 
and Judaism (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2003). 
that engaging Jewish theology has affected the theological 
thinking of many Christian scholars.  But it need not be the 
case. It depends on the person and the character of the 
“dialogue.” 
Orthodox Judaism recoils at either of these possibilities 
of syncretism and insists on the uniqueness of the Jewish 
religious “project” asserting that existentially the Jews are a 
“people who dwell alone.”  This negative reaction to anything 
that smacks of common beliefs may be a key to 
understanding the Orthodox “mood” on dialogue.52 
 
E. How Do You Divide the Sacred from the Profane in 
Civic Life? 
 
As is well known, while Soloveitchik proscribed what he 
calls theological dialogue, he did allow, and indeed 
encouraged, coalitions of interfaith groups to discuss and act 
on social welfare issues.  Thus Soloveitchik has noted: 
As a matter of fact our common interests lie not in the 
realm of faith, but in that of the secular orders.  
There, we all face a powerful antagonist, we all have 
to contend with a considerable number of matters of 
great concern. The relationship between two 
communities must be outer-directed and related to 
the secular orders with which men of faith come face 
to face. In the secular sphere, we may discuss 
positions to be taken, ideas to be evolved, and plans 
to be formulated. In these matters, religious 
communities may together recommend action to be 
                                                          
52 I recently saw a production of Hyam Maccoby’s “The Disputation.” While 
not vouching for its historical accuracy, no one watching Theodore 
Bikel’s presentation of Nachmanides would worry about disputations 
ineluctably leading to syncretism. See:  
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/29/AR 
2005092900586_3.html.  
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developed and may seize the initiative to be 
implemented later by general society. 53 
Indeed, that has been the stated position of the modern 
orthodox community.54 
Given Soloveitchik’s general proscription I find this 
“waiver” puzzling. Certainly, as a theoretical matter one 
cannot separate secular activity for the common good from 
its theological underpinnings. This is true of Judaism and 
from what I can see from teaching at the Catholic University 
of America for Roman Catholicism as well. The extraordinary 
emphasis on “hesed” at my law school (where law review 
editors sign up for their stint at homeless food preparation) 
stems from their understanding of Catholic mission. 
Ironically, Soloveitchik recognized this.  In a footnote in 
“Confrontation,” he wrote, “The term ‘secular orders’ is used 
here in accordance with its popular semantics.  For the man 
of faith, this term is a misnomer.  God claims the whole, not 
a part of man, and whatever He established as an order 
within the scheme of creation is sacred.”55 This makes it 
difficult to work out the boundaries of common welfare 
activities from religious interaction. 
                                                          
53 Soloveitchik, “Confrontation,” p. 24. 
54 See Rabbinical Council of America, “Statement Adopted by the 
Rabbinical Council of America at the Mid-Winter Conference, February 
3-5, 1964,” Tradition 6/2 (1964): 28-29: 
 Any suggestion that the historical and meta-historical worth of a faith 
community be viewed against the backdrop of another faith, and the mere 
hint that a revision of basic historic attitudes is anticipated, are 
incongruous with the fundamentals of religious liberty and freedom of 
conscience and can only breed discord and suspicion. Such an approach 
is unacceptable to any self-respecting faith community that is proud of its 
past, vibrant and active in the present and determined to live on in the 
future and to continue serving God in its own individual way. Only full 
appreciation on the part of all of the singular role, inherent worth and 
basic prerogatives of each religious community will help promote the spirit 
of cooperation among faiths. 
55 Soloveitchik, “Confrontation,” note 8. 
As but one example, consider the State of Israel, a topic 
for which the Jewish community may well most desire wider 
public political support. Putting secular Zionism aside, it is 
passing certain that Zionism from an Orthodox perspective is 
based on theological tenets – as but one example, some 
affirm that the establishment of the State of Israel is the 
beginning of the “dawn of our redemption.”56 Indeed, 
Soloveitchik himself has argued for the religious, that is to 
say halakhic (if not messianic) status of the Jewish state in 
Kol Dodi Dofek.57 Conversely, while sympathy for Israel after 
World War II was clearly based on Christian sympathy (if not 
guilt) after the Holocaust, doctrinal acceptance by Christians, 
whether Catholic or Evangelical, turns on their understand-
ings (albeit differing) of Christian theology. How can one 
create a religious coalition on behalf of Israel while ignoring 
religious doctrine? The same is true, if not less obvious, with 
religious coalitions for social justice, protection of the 
environment or other aspects of tikkun olam. 
 
F. Soloveitchik and the “Soloveitchik Line” 
 
In trying to understand the varieties of meanings drawn 
from the text in “Confrontation” regarding interreligious 
dialogue, one is reminded of Karl Marx’s adage, “All I know 
is that I am not a Marxist.”58 The fact is that while numerous 
scholars claim to follow Soloveitchik’s teaching, they 
                                                          
56 The Hebrew is Reishit Tzmichat Ge’ulatinu, which translates more 
accurately as the beginning of the flowering of our redemption. The term 
comes from a prayer for the state of Israel drafted by Chief Rabbi 
Yitzhak Herzog in 1948. The phrase is considered central to our 
understanding of religious Zionism, which views the creation of the state 
of Israel in eschatological terms.  
57 Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Kol Dodi Dofek: Listen - My Beloved Knocks 
(Jersey City, NJ: KTAV, 2006) 
58 “Letter from Friedrich Engels to Conrad Schmidt” (Aug. 5, 1890), in 
Dona Torr, ed., Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Correspondence 1846-
1895 (London: M. Lawrence, 1934), 472. 
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interpret the meaning of his proscription against 
interreligious dialogue in radically different and at times 
contradictory ways.59 
Marc B. Shapiro, citing David Hartman, suggests that the 
proscription is against “some sort of organized, presumably 
official, meeting,” between members of each religion.60 The 
concept calls to mind the medieval disputation and the sad 
history of Jewish-Catholic relations to which they testify.61 
But those disputations were not necessarily “official” in 
the sense that the debaters were authorized to represent 
their faiths. Indeed, while the Church has official theologians, 
it is not clear that Judaism has any such “office” within its 
hierarchy. 
In marked contrast David Berger suggests that “[i]t is… 
friendly theological discussion and not religious 
disputation”62 that is forbidden because such “friendly” 
discussion would, as Soloveitchik says, create pressures “to 
trade favors pertaining to fundamental matters of faith, and 
                                                          
59 In that regard we should remember the cautionary note of Marvin Fox, 
that “there are writers who claim to know the Rav’s unexpressed inner 
thoughts, his unspoken aims and purposes, his conscious and 
unconscious motivations, and who offer accounts of his thought based 
on this supposed secret knowledge. There is in this style of 
interpretation a level of presumptuousness which is not only tasteless, 
but also profoundly and inexcusably misleading.”  Marvin Fox, “The 
Unity and Structure of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik’s Thought,” 
Tradition 24:2 (1989): 45-46.  
60 Marc B. Shapiro, “’Confrontation’:  A Mixed Legacy,” n.1, http://www.bc. 
edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/center/conferences/soloveitchik/ 
Sol_shapiro.htm. Hartman speaks of an “official political meeting of 
‘representatives’ and ‘spokesmen’” as opposed to “students who are 
studying together in university or theological colleges, or people wanting 
to study Talmud or New Testament thought or Thomas Aquinas or 
Maimonides together” [Hartman, Love and Terror, 157-58]. 
61 See note 34. Also Hershel Reichman, “The Cardinals’ Visit: Thoughts of 
a Rosh Yeshiva,” The Commentator (Yeshiva Univ.), Feb. 17, 2004: 
http://www.yucommentator.com/media/paper652/news/2004/02/17/Editorials 
opEd/The-Cardinals.Visit.Thoughts.Of.A.Rosh.Yeshiva-607709.shtml  
62 See note 26. 
to reconcile ‘some’ differences.”63 I suppose there is a 
legitimate fear that propensity and intellectual intimacy (that 
is to say “friendly” discussion) will lead to a “rounding of the 
edges” that distinguish Judaism from the “other.”64 This is 
the danger of syncretism that I discussed above. 
Others have suggested that Soloveitchik used the term 
“religious dialogue” to include not only “discussing with 
priests the Gospels – their theology, but also... discussing 
the Torah – which is our theology” including discussions of 
Torah-u-Maadah65 (the combinations and intersections of 
Jewish and secular studies).  
Further, Jeremy Wieder analyzes “interfaith dialogue” as 
referring to two faiths trying to engage in reconciliation.  As 
he suggests, 
This, by definition, requires each side, as 
the Rav formulates it, “to trade favors 
pertaining to fundamental matters of faith.”  
When the Rav speaks of “religious dialogue” 
(as opposed to “social dialogue”) he refers not 
to information sessions about faith matters, 
but to dialogue, a conversation which 
presumes genuine “give and take” between 
the participants.  If a Jew were to give a 
lecture about some aspect of Jewish faith or 
halakha to a non-Jew, even if the non-Jew 
were to ask questions (thereby engaging in 
“dialogue” in the common use of the term), he 
                                                          
63 Soloveitchik, “Confrontation,” p. 25. 
64  Some, like David Berger, have criticized reciprocity:  See David Berger, 
“Statement Regarding the New York Times Ad by Dabru Emet,” (Sept. 
14, 2000):  http://www.ou.org/public/statements/2000/betty25.htm.  See 
also “Dabru Emet:  A Jewish Statement on Christians and Christianity” 
at: http://www.icjs.org/what/njsp/dabruemet.html. 
65 One might consider the marked contrast in Heschel’s position in 
Reuven Kimmelman, “Rabbis Joseph B. Soloveitchik and Abraham 
Joshua Heschel on Jewish-Christian Relations,” Edah 4/2 (2004):1-21 
at  http://www.edah.org/backend/JournalArticle/4_2_Kimelman.pdf. 
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would not be engaging in interfaith dialogue 
but in interfaith monologue.66 
Thus, describing an officially denominated “open 
dialogue” between Chief Rabbis and Cardinals brought 
together by the World Jewish Congress, the Jewish 
participants explained their participation by stating that 
“because there were no exchanges of views beyond the 
prepared papers, it did not formally qualify as theological 
dialogue.”67 Consider what is being suggested. Give and 
take is dialogue and therefore forbidden; separate lectures 
are not. And if the audience asks questions? If the lectures 
are on point-counterpoint topics? These distinctions are so 
formal as to be ultimately differences without a distinction. 
To further muddy the waters, David Hartman suggests 
that Soloveitchik’s fear is not the fact of interfaith dialogue 
but the concern that the wrong type of person will undertake 
it.68 Hartman reads Soloveitchik as intending “Confrontation” 
as “a political responsum that addresses the issue of public 
and politically charged discussions between Judaism and 
Christianity as institutions. It is a response to the way Jews 
are to survive in an open society that offers both intellectual 
riches and the frightful reality of assimilation.”69 As many 
have pointed out, Soloveitchik's work is replete with 
references to Christian theologians. What Soloveitchik fears, 
Hartman suggests, is the “westernized Jew” who “may well 
                                                          
66 Jeremy Wieder, “The Cardinals’ Visit:  Differing Thoughts of Another 




67 Nacha Cattan, “Cardinals Meet for a Dialogue with Top Rabbis” Forward 
(Jan. 23, 2004). 
68  I owe this interpretation of “Hartman on Soloveitchik” to Daniel Rynhold, 
“The Philosophical Foundations of Soloveitchik's Critique of Interfaith 
Dialogue,” Harvard Theological Review 96/1 (2003): 101-106. 
69 Hartman, Love and Terror, 156-57. 
acquiesce in the subjugation of Judaism to universal 
categories that will eliminate its numinous faith element.”70 
 This view is reinforced by Walter Wurzberger who 
argues the prudential position that “only properly qualified 
specialists should devote themselves to the study in depth of 
non-Jewish theologies.”71 Wurzberger (and I believe, 
Soloveitchik) considers that dialogue is a dialectical process 
in the sense that “various particular formulations of religious 
truth are but inadequate attempts to appropriate a higher but 
rather elusive religious truth.”72 Soloveitchik rejects this view 
as indeed he should. But analytically at least, Wurzberger 
had it wrong. If it is true that the study of other theologies 
(and in particular theologies that have arisen against the 
context of Judaism) can teach us something about our own 
faith, it need not be because we are “modif[ying] or 
correct[ing] [religious faith] in the light of another system.”73  
The desire to understand the other is not an effort to extract 
“an essence of religion … from a variety of religious 
affirmations.”74  This I believe is one of the root weaknesses 
of Soloveitchik’s approach. 
In fairness, I should note that Lawrence Kaplan urges a 
more nuanced view of this distinction.  He points out that 
Soloveitchik “is careful never to speak of ‘the secular orders’ 
or ‘the secular sphere.’  He speaks of ‘the public world of 
                                                          
70  Rynhold: 106. 
71 Walter S. Wurzburger, “Justification and Limitations of Interfaith 
Dialogue,” in Walter S. Wurzburger & Eugene B. Borowitz, Judaism and 
the Interfaith Movement (New York: Synagogue Council of America, 
1967), 12. David Rosen tells us that the late Pinchas Peli cites to a 
specific conversation he had with Soloveitchik affirming this view, David 
Rosen, “Orthodox Judaism and Jewish-Christian Dialogue,” at  
http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/center/conferences/ 
soloveitchik/sol_rosen.htm. 
72 Wurzburger, 13. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid., 14. 
Studies in Christian-Jewish Relations                    Volume 1, (2005-2006): 151-169 
Breger, “A Reassesssment of Rav Soloveitchik’s Essay on Interfaith Dialogue”    163 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol1/iss1/art18  
humanitarian and cultural endeavors,’ of ‘areas of universal 
concern,’ or ‘socio-cultural and moral problems.’”75 
Kaplan suggests that for 
the line between permissible and impermissible interfaith 
dialogue is not between interfaith dialogue in “the realm 
of faith” and interfaith dialogue in the “secular sphere.” It 
is between two types of religious interfaith dialogue. The 
Rav, that is, was opposed to interfaith religious 
theological dialogue ‘concerning the doctrinal, dogmatic, 
or ritual aspects of faith,’ for those aspects represent the 
individual, unique, and private side of religion, but he 
supported interfaith religious humanitarian dialogue 
concerning socio-cultural and moral issues, for such 
dialogue was grounded in religious categories and vales 
that represent the universal and public side of religion.76 
The distinction Kaplan suggests is more fully developed 
in a document styled “On Interfaith Relationships” that 
Soloveitchik drafted some years after “Confrontation” to 
guide the practice of rabbis belonging to the Rabbinical 
Council of America.77  There Soloveitchik states: 
We are … opposed to any public debate, dialogue or 
symposium concerning the doctrinal, dogmatic, or ritual 
aspects of our faith vis-à-vis ‘similar’ aspects of another 
faith community. … When however, we move from the 
private world of faith to the public world of 
humanitarianism and cultural endeavors, communication 
among the various faith communities is desirable and 
even essential.  We are ready to enter into dialogue on 
such topics as War and Peace, Poverty, Freedom, Man’s 
Moral Values… Civil Rights, etc., which revolve about the 
                                                          
75  Lawrence Kaplan, “Revisionism and the Rav: The Struggle for the Soul 
of Modern Orthodoxy,” Judaism 48/3 (Summer 1999): 305.  
76 Ibid., 306. 
77  Ibid., 309. 
religious spiritual aspects of our civilization.  Discussion 
within these areas will, of course, be within the 
framework of our religious outlooks and terminology.78 
 
G. The Anti-Dialogue “Mood” 
 
The wide variety of “understandings” of Soloveitchik’s 
text suggests that whatever its original meaning, it has come 
to mean something “more” on the Orthodox street. The ban 
on dialogue has been extended way beyond intellectual 
discussion to include, if not a ban on contact, then anything 
that might be viewed as recognition. This is clear from the 
remarkable controversy over the visit of a delegation of 
cardinals to the Yeshiva University Beis Midrash (study hall) 
in January 2004.79 The cardinals did not come to debate or 
even to lecture, they came to watch. Even so, the backlash 
among the Yeshiva world was extreme with many 
commentators referring to a violation of Soloveitchik’s 
ruling.80 And when the cardinals visited again in March 2005, 
a student protest petition led the Yeshiva administration to 
request that they come without their vestments81 and not 
enter the study hall.82 
                                                          
78 Joseph B. Soloveitchik, “On Interfaith Relationships,” Rabbinical Rec. 
(February 1966), also available at “Joseph B. Soloveitchik, 
‘Confrontation’” in Norman Lamm and Walter S. Wurzburger eds., A 
Treasury of “Tradition” (New York: Hebrew Pub. Co., 1967), 78-80. 
Emphasis added.  
79 A sparse account can be found in Daniel J. Wakin and Laurie 
Goodstein, “In Upper Manhattan, Talmudic Scholars Look Up and Find 
Cardinals Among the Rabbis,” New York Times, Jan. 20, 2004: B5. 
80 Reichman; Ari Fridman, “Cardinals Visit Again Amid Student Pressure 
Against,” The Commentator (Yeshiva Univ.), Mar. 8, 2005: 
http://www.yucommentator.com/media/paper652/news/2005/03/08/News/Ca
rdinals. Visit.Again.Amid.Student.Pressure.Against-883249.shtml?page=1. 
81 I do not speak to the halakhic question here but relay an anecdote told 
me by George Weigel, the author of a magisterial biography of John 
Paul II. Weigel relates that when John Paul was planning his history 
Studies in Christian-Jewish Relations                    Volume 1, (2005-2006): 151-169 
Breger, “A Reassesssment of Rav Soloveitchik’s Essay on Interfaith Dialogue”    164 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol1/iss1/art18  
In a 1951 Supreme Court case analyzing the level of 
deference courts should afford administrative agency 
decisions, Justice Frankfurter famously tells us that 
Congress did not articulate a specific level of deference, but 
instead set a “mood.” 83 In reviewing the wide (and often 
contradictory) range of understandings of “Confrontation,” 
the only way we can reasonably interpret the “Soloveitchik 
Doctrine” is that it reflects a “mood” (or hashkafa) rather than 
an analytic parsing of the concept. Doing so may provide a 
useful way of approaching the text. For one, it explains the 
views of those commentators who have stressed 
Soloveitchik’s context-oriented methodology. Further, it 
focuses the discussion on what is happening in the orthodox 
world today. Finally, it resolves the question of whether 
Korn’s vision has moved considerably from the concerns and 
                                                                                                                       
making visit to Rome’s main synagogue, some congregants requested 
(or demanded) that he should not come with his Papal vestments.  
When the Chief Rabbi of Rome, Elio Toaff, raised this, the Pope 
responded that if he were visiting as a private citizen then such a 
stricture could be easily followed. However, the entire point of the 
exercise was for him to visit as the head of the Roman Catholic Church 
and, as such, he was required to wear his vestments. The point is worth 
pondering. 
82 Fridman. One student suggested that the presence of the Cardinals in 
the Beis Midrash would be “emotionally distressing.”  More resources 
can be found in a former Yeshiva University student’s blog, at 
http://hirhurim.blogspot.com/2004/03/cardinals-in-beis-midrash-
rundown-of.html. 
83 Universal Camera v. N.L.R.B.,340 U.S. 474,487 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.):  
 It is fair to say that in all this Congress expressed a mood. And it 
expressed its mood not merely by oratory but by legislation.  As 
legislation that mood must be respected, even though it can only 
serve as a standard for judgment and not as a body of rigid rules 
assuring sameness of application.  Enforcement of such broad 
standards implies subtlety of mind and solidity of judgment. But it is 
not for us to question that Congress may assume such qualities in the 
federal judiciary. 
insights of the essay.84 While one can make an argument 
either way, if one accepts my view that the essay articulates 
a “mood” or skeptical approach to relations with Christianity, 
the question is a non-issue. 
 
2. Interreligious Dialogue & Christianity 
 
A.  Why are Orthodox Jews so Cautious About 
Interaction with Christianity? 
 
It is difficult to understand the refusal to engage in 
dialogue with Christianity, be it formal or informal, as 
reflecting anything other than a deep insecurity of Judaism in 
the theological arena.85  One senses that behind all this 
animosity to talking with Christians is some kind of 
psychological need – a desire to show that as a people we 
don’t need them anymore.  This view is reinforced by Erica 
Brown’s suggestion that it is a denial of what she calls 
“historical dignity” to talk with them.86  As Reichman pointed 
out, “Millions of Jewish martyrs demand no less of us.”87 
I can certainly understand this attitude which is validating 
both to those who decry dialogue and to the Jewish people, 
                                                          
84 See Edward Breuer’s comment:  “I do not think that Dr. Korn’s desire to 
affirm the desirability and importance of interfaith dialogue can be fairly 
rooted in Rav Soloveitchik’s essay”  [“Revisiting ‘Confrontation’ After 
Forty Years:  Some Comments,” at http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-
elements/texts/center/conferences/soloveitchik/sol_breuer.htm ]. 
85 I suppose it could also include a judgment by Jews that Christians do 
not deserve to have Jews speak openly with them about Judaism. This 
may be because of past Christian sins against Judaism and that it is not 
appropriate or some would say “dignified” for Rabbis to talk with Church 
officials (see following note). One commentator has suggested that a 
meeting between clerics and Rabbis (let alone dialogue) is inferentially 
forgiving the Church for past sins and goes so far as to ask “whether we 
Jews today have the moral license to forgive the Church for sins 
committed against the Jews in the past”  [Reichman, see note 61]. 
86  Brown, “The Un-Response,” see note 44. 
87  Reichman, see note 61. 
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but it is hardly a normative rule. And indeed, from a 
prudential perspective we should remember that even if it is 
validating, it is validating only to ourselves. The fact that we 
will not talk to Christians certainly does not make them feel 
that they have been put in their place. To the extent that 
Christians feel an obligation to Jews because of the 
historical record, it is hard to believe that that sense of 
Christian “guilt” is in any way increased because of the 
Jewish refusal to engage in dialogue. 
Some have further argued that even if the changes that 
have occurred since World War II in Christian thought and 
practice deserve full credit, the “conditions making for 
present amity may not persist.”88 Indeed, some have 
suggested that it will take a number of generations before 
Jews can trust this Christian volte-face and respond 
positively.89 While I agree with Shalom Carmy that “[t]he 20th 
century … has been exceptionally hard on prophets of 
inevitable progress in human relations[,]”90 that is at best an 
argument to prudence in dialogue but not an absolute ban. 
I suppose one could argue that it is possible to learn 
what is valuable about the “other” without talking to them.  
Presumably one can read books or listen to tapes. But surely 
if you have overcome the general objection that one should 
spend one’s spare time learning Torah rather than learning 
about the other then limiting personal contact seems an 
artificial constraint. 
At a popular level the ignorance of Christianity in Israeli 
circles is breathtaking, as is the lack of engagement at any 
level, be it cultural, political, let alone theological. While it is 
likely true that Israeli Jews do not have historical insecurity in 
dealing with the Church, they often show an equally 
unfortunate lack of respect for other religious traditions. 
                                                          
88  Carmy, see note 32. 
89  Ibid. See also Klapper, (note 45). 
90  Carmy. 
B. The Role of Christianity in Judaism 
 
One thing is clear. While Christianity has recognized 
Judaism as a source of Christian self-understanding, no 
such correlative urge is felt in Jewish circles. More and 
more, Christian seminaries offer courses in Judaism. I know 
of no similar courses in Christianity or the early Church at 
Jewish Theological Seminary or Yeshiva University. At a 
recent gathering at the Catholic University of America, an 
eminent Cardinal spoke with pride of his havruta (learning 
partnership) in Talmud study and urged joint Talmud study 
by Christian and Jewish scholars to better understand the 
life of Jesus. Very few Jewish scholars seek similar joint 
study of the Gospels to better elucidate the world of the early 
rabbis. 
This negativity towards Christianity exists across the 
board not only in the yeshiva world, but in a more nuanced 
manner, in modern orthodoxy as well. Deborah Weissman 
suggests the situation is different in Israel.91 I am surprised 
to learn it. At best, Israelis remain ignorant of any but the 
most extreme caricatures of Christianity. Uri Bialer reports 
that “the current curriculum of the state education system 
refers to Jesus at best once and then only cursorily. The 
state religious education system makes no mention 
whatsoever.”92 
Too often the treatment of Christians in Israel 
approaches, at times, “the practice of contempt.”  Recent 
articles tell of religious Jews spitting on an Armenian 
Archbishop and a crucifix during a religious procession and 
                                                          
91 Deborah Weissman, “The Perspective of an Israeli Educator,” at: 
http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/center/conferences/ 
soloveitchik/sol_weissman.htm. 
92 Uri Bialer, Cross on the Star of David, The Christian World in Israel’s 
Foreign Policy, 1948-1967 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana Univ. Press, 
2005), ix.  
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numerous verbal and physical assaults on Christian clergy.93  
In 1995 a religious soldier sprayed gunfire at a church in 
Haifa, claiming, according to the Jerusalem Post, that “it was 
a shame that he had to explain in court his motive for the 
shooting, which he said was self explanatory and written in 
Torah. His motive, he said, was to destroy all idols….”94  
While this attitude reflects a significant issue in Jewish 
sociology (and thought) regarding the status of the non-Jew, 
the insularity it reflects is heightened by the refusal to 
dialogue. While, as seen below, there may be some flexibility 
at the level of institutional leadership, other than David 
Rosen there are precious few orthodox rabbis in Israel or 
America who engage in interfaith anything, let alone 
dialogue with Christianity and I won’t even speak of Islam.95 
 
C. The Chief Rabbis’ Initiatives  
 
 In recent years the Vatican has entered into official 
dialogue with a group of Israeli rabbis organized by the Chief 
Rabbinate of Israel (both Ashkenazi and Sephardic). This 
                                                          
93 Steven Erlanger, “Spitting Incident Fuels Debate on Intolerance – 
Jerusalem Examines its Religious Divide,” International Herald Tribune, 
Oct. 19, 2004: http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/10/18/news/journal.php;  
also his, “Many Faiths but Little Tolerance in Jerusalem,” International 
Herald Tribune, Oct. 20, 2004: http://www.iht.com/articles/ 
2004/10/19/news/journal.php; Abigail Radoszkowicz, “Interfaith Leaders 
Issue Plea for Mutual Respect,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 27, 2004, in 
News; Amiram Barkat, “Christians in Jerusalem Want Jews to Stop 
Spitting on Them,” Haaretz, Dec. 10, 2004:  http://www.haaretz.com/ 
hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=487412;. These articles describe this 
and similar incidents.  See also, the editorial, “Jerusalem’s Disgrace,” 
Haaretz, Dec. 10, 2004: http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ 
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=487472&contrassID=1. 
94  I owe this reference to David Berger.  The article is “Soldier Who Shot 
up Church Sent for Psychiatric Evaluation: Suspect Says He Was 
Destroying Idols,” Jerusalem Post, May 28, 1995: 12. 
95 The remarkable Mordecai Froman, the Rav of Tekoa in Judea, is a 
notable exception. 
dialogue has been undertaken by the “Joint Commission of 
the Chief Rabbinate of Israel’s Delegation for Relations with 
the Catholic Church and the Holy See’s Commission for 
Religious Relations with the Jews.” There have been five 
meetings, two in Jerusalem and three in Rome which have 
included visits to the Vatican and audiences with the Pope.96  
A wide variety of issues were on the table for discussion.  
These have included subjects including The Sanctity of 
Human Life and Family Values; The Relevance of Central 
Religious Teachings in the Holy Scriptures We Share, for 
Contemporary and Future Society; A Shared Vision of Social 
Justice and Ethical Conduct; and Respect for Human Life.  
The sacred character of the Holy Places in Jerusalem was 
also discussed.97 
                                                          
96  A preliminary meeting took place on June 5, 2002, for which no official 
statement was made.  The texts of four joint statements that have been 
issued from subsequent meetings can be found at the Vatican’s website 
at: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/sub-
index/index_relations-jews.htm. 
     In addition to the above, Pope Benedict XVI published on October 26, 
2005 a letter commemorating Nostra Aetate: http://www.vatican.va/ 
holy_father/benedict_xvi/letters/2005/documents/hf_ben-xvi_let_ 
20051026_nostra-aetate_en.html. See too David Rosen, “Nostra 
Aetate, Forty Years After Vatican II: Present and Future Perspectives:” 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/relations 
-jews-docs/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_20051027_rabbi-rosen_en.html.  
97  See “Statement to the Press from the Meeting of the Bilateral 
Committee of the Holy See’s Commission for Religious Relations with 
the Jews and the Chief Rabbinate of Israel, Oct. 17-19 2004”: 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/relations-
jews-docs/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_20041019_rabbinate-israel_en.html :  
 Jerusalem has a sacred character for all the children of Abraham.  We 
call on all relevant authorities to respect this character and to prevent 
actions which offend the sensibilities of religious communities that reside 
in Jerusalem and hold her dear.  We call on religious authorities to protest 
publicly when actions of disrespect towards religious persons, symbols 
and Holy Sites are committed, such as the desecration of cemeteries and 
the recent assault on the Armenian Patriarch of Jerusalem.  We call on 
them to educate their communities to behave with respect and dignity 
towards people and towards their attachment to their faith. 
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While it has been suggested that the agenda items have 
been carefully worded to escape the strictures of 
Soloveitchik’s position, any suggestion that the agenda items 
are not impregnated with theological considerations is, at 
best, caviling.  The documents are drenched with a religious 
anthropology and if anything make short shrift of the view 
that the faith community can talk about family values or 
social justice without God. 
The Israeli Chief Rabbinate, of course, unlike American 
modern orthodoxy, has never viewed itself as “under” Rabbi 
Soloveitchik’s legal authority. Furthermore, to my knowledge, 
the Chief Rabbinate has never provided a halakhic analysis 
of the rationale for these meetings. Perhaps they viewed 
them as self-evident! Nonetheless, this deepening 
engagement and its obviously theological character 
significantly undercuts the practical force of the so-called 
Soloveitchik prohibition. 
The reasons for the willingness or the apparent 
willingness of the Israeli rabbinate to “engage” the Vatican 
may be in part political – in some sense they represent the 
State of Israel. It may, of course, reflect a different halakhic 
reading of the sources, a point well worth further analysis.  
However, their position reflects to some extent a Jewish self-
confidence that comes from Jewish sovereignty. The Israeli 
rabbinate, whatever their halakhic views regarding 
interaction with non-Jews, finds it hard to accept 
Soloveitchik’s overriding fear that the “community of the 
many” will necessarily manipulate and control the 
“community of the few.” Dr. Deborah Weissman suggests 
that the insecurity this refusal reflects does not really exist in 
Israeli Orthodox circles.98 Figures like Chief Rabbi She’ar 
Yashuv Cohen of Haifa, head of the Chief Rabbinate’s 
Committee on Relations with the Vatican, have felt it easier 
to engage in interreligious dialogue than their American 
Orthodox colleagues. Following a meeting with the Latin, 
                                                          
98  See note 91. 
Greek, and Armenian patriarchs, She’ar Yashuv Cohen 
noted, “Both sides understand that there is to be no attempt 
to change the other’s opinions.  Ever since the Pope’s recent 
ruling against missionizing Jews, this has become much 
easier.”99 This is understandable. Zionist ideology tells us 
that the creation of a Jewish state will eliminate the unequal 
relationships with other nations and religions. And Israeli 
Jews do not experience any such inequality in their daily life.  
Thus for Israelis the grounds for Soloveitchik’s fear of 
religious dialogue no longer exist. And indeed because of 
this majority status, even though there is significant 
negativity to Christianity in Israeli culture, the political and 
rabbinic leadership may well feel freer to interact with 
Christian clerics, if only, for “reasons of state.” 
 
3.  Where Do We Go From Here?  
 
It should be obvious that the Orthodox Jewish 
community’s response to “Confrontation” has been more 
sociological than theological or philosophical. The essay has 
been interpreted by the Orthodox rabbinate to apply to a far 
greater range of activities than Soloveitchik actually 
discussed in his essay and is used to validate a general 
attitudinal approach by Orthodox Judaism – one that is 
broadly antagonistic to a wide range of interactions with the 
Catholic Church. The ways in which “Confrontation” has 
played out in the Orthodox world reflects the sociological and 
psychological needs of a community both traumatized by the 
Holocaust and increasingly self-assertive (if not triumphalist) 
with the rise of the State of Israel and the uniquely 
successful integration of Jews into American political life. 
Some kinds of activities have been approved – largely 
social and political issues in which the Jewish community 
had a deep concern.  But when the Jewish community was 
                                                          
99 “Rabbi & MKs Upgrade Israel-Christian Relations,” Arutz Sheva, Jan. 
24, 2005: http://www.israelnationalnews.com/news.php3?id=75808. 
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interested in such joint action, it made no difference that the 
basis for the social and political coalition was in its 
underlying nature theological. 
This attitude is reflected in the almost extreme skepticism 
regarding Catholic-Jewish relations of many of the Orthodox 
commentators to Korn’s essay.100 The comments are 
permeated with a sense that the Church can turn on a dime 
and revert to its outdated supersessionist theology. There is 
also a frankly surreal approach to the place of Jews in the 
modern world. It is as if we are the center of the universe 
and make judgments as independent actors without 
reference to the view of others. While that happy state may 
come to pass at the end of days, until then we remain “in” 
history, not outside it, and must accommodate to it or suffer 
the consequences. 
It is unfortunate that those who would forbid full 
engagement with other faith-based communities neglect the 
costs of such parochialism. To the extent to which dialogue 
helps us to better understand the belief system of the 
“other,” we come to better understand ourselves. Indeed, it 
is, I think, a truism that every social and intellectual 
movement develops, at least in part, because of some 
human or social need.  Many scholars have suggested “that 
the Nazis did draw their popular support from people who felt 
morally outraged by the social order around them.”101  
                                                          
100 Carmy (note 32); Klapper (note 45); Brown (note 86). 
101 Barrington Moore, Jr., Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and 
Revolt (White Plains, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1978), 417. The social 
composition of National Socialist membership was drawn 
disproportionately from “the rural farmers and small-town middle 
classes” [Stanley G. Payne, Fascism (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin 
Press, 1980), 58]. A more nuanced view of “the attraction of the 
successful fascist movements for millions of peasants and workers” can 
be found in Walter Laqueur, Fascism: Past, Present, Future (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 45.  See also Alan S. Milward, “Fascism 
and the Economy,” in Walter Laqueur ed., Fascism – A Reader’s Guide 
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1976), 385: “[T]he propensity to join 
Methodism responded to a need of the English peasants to 
find a place in a rapidly industrializing society.102 And 
Sabbatarianism in the 17th century can be understood as a 
response to the political instability and social revolt reflected 
in what many historians have termed the general “crisis of 
the seventeenth century.”103 So by understanding the belief 
system of the other we understand better the variety of ways 
in which human beings respond to the social and 
psychological forces that beset them.  In so doing, we tease 
out yet another thread of the tapestry of mankind, and we 
learn more about the manifold creatures of God. 
The value of interfaith dialogue is not simply that it 
assists our understanding of the human tapestry.  It has 
practical benefits to the Jewish people as well. If we accept 
that Christians are attempting to revise their historically 
pejorative theological understanding of Judaism, why should 
                                                                                                                       
a fascist part was determined more by psychological considerations 
than by social class”. 
102 Elie Halévy, The Birth of Methodism (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 
1971), 64-65. See also Julia Stewart Werner, The Primitive Methodist 
Connexion:  Its Background and Early History 30-50 (Madison, Wis.: 
Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1984).  For a sociological analysis of the 
emergence of Methodism, see E.P. Thompson, The Making of the 
English Working Class (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), 350-400. 
103 The term comes from E.J. Hobsbawm, “The Crisis of the Seventeenth 
Century,” in Trevor Aston, ed., Crisis in Europe, 1560-1660 (New York: 
Basic Books, 1965), 5-58. See Stephen Sharot, Messianism, Mysticism, 
and Magic:  A Sociological Analysis of Jewish Religious Movements 
(Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1982), 110.  We should note 
that the great historian of the Sabbatean movement, Gershom Scholem, 
rejects this analysis of Sabbatarianism as “simplistic[,]” see Gershom 
Scholem, Sabbatai Sevi:  The Mystical Messiah 1626-1676 (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton Univ. Press 1973), 1. But more recent scholarship 
considers Scholem’ s view that the Lurianic Kabbalah was “the central 
factor in the use of Sabbatarianism” as a flawed analysis suggesting 
“that the Sabbatean movement was a result of the forces of change that 
already existed in the Jewish community, rather than its cause.” See 
Matt Goldish, The Sabbatean Prophets (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. 
Press, 2004), 168-69. 
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we not assist them by providing accurate understandings of 
Jewish theological doctrine? Whatever else it may prove to 
be, proactive interfaith dialogue today is not the zero-sum 
game of a disputation or a covert effort at conversion but a 
chance for Jews to eliminate stereotypes and dispel misper-
ceptions by presenting an accurate view of Jewish belief. 
Furthermore, the reality is that we face the possibility of a 
war of civilizations between the West and Islam (indeed, 
some believe that war is at hand).  Unless we are of the 
despairing view that religion can only be a source of human 
fratricide (think Thirty Years’ War), we should be searching 
for every possible modality by which religion can serve a 
transformative role – and serve as a source for peace 
between nations and, indeed, civilizations.  While one might 
respond that coalitions oriented toward the delivery of social 
services satisfy that need and are sufficient unto the day, 
relationships based on calculated self-interest are far 
different than relationships based on authentic engagement. 
We are engaged, as well, in a cultural war in our own 
country.  While it may be an exaggeration to say that “the 
barbarians are at the gates,” there can be little doubt that 
many persons of faith have more in common with each other 
in America than with secular society.  Abraham Heschel 
understood this well: 
 
[T]here is another ecumenical movement, worldwide in 
extent and influence:  nihilism.  We must choose 
between interfaith and inter-nihilism. Cynicism is not 
parochial.  Should religions insist upon the illusion of 
complete isolation? Should we refuse to be on speaking 
terms with one another and hope for each other’s failure? 
Or should we pray for each other’s health, and help one 
another in preserving one’s respective legacy, in 
preserving a common legacy?104 
Most adherents of the “Soloveitchik doctrine” allow 
interfaith coalitions under narrow restrictions:  they must deal 
only with politics or the delivery of social services.  In my 
view this kind of narrow interaction, however, fails to capture 
the human and spiritual synergies that could come from the 
full and vibrant interaction of all those who claim themselves 
as “children of Abraham.” 
                                                          
104 Abraham Joshua Heschel, “No Religion is an Island,” Union Seminary 
Q. Rev. 21/2/1 (January 1966): 119. 
